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During her five years at the World Bank, Harrison
initiated four studies involving multinational
enterprises in four developing countries: Ivory Coast,
Mexico, Morocco and Venezuela. These studies
measure the role of multinational enterprises in
promoting technology transfer; test whether
multinationals push up wages for local workers; and
analyze the validity of the "pollution haven
hypothesis," which states that foreign investors flock
to developing countries to take advantage of lax
environmental standards. Harrison finds no
evidence of pollution havens and shows that
multinationals raise wages for local workers.
However, she finds that technology transfer has
generally been limited to the joint ventures who
receive foreign equity participation.
Ann Harrison is an Assistant Professor of Finance and
Economics at Columbia Business School. She joined
Columbia in 1994 after spending five years as an economist
with the World Bank. She has also taught at Harvard
University.
The author would like to thank Jonas Harrison for his very
helpful comments and suggestions. This research reflects the
work of the individual author and does not necessarily reflect
the views and policies of the World Bank or the countries it
represents.
Within policy circles, there is an ongoing debate over
the economic and social impact of multinationals in devel-
oping countries. Should poor countries encourage multina-
tionals to locate within their borders, or do foreign
investors exploit the local population and take advantage of
cheap natural resources? My research, much of it initiated
at the World Bank over the last five years, examines this
question. 1 concentrate on four issues: the role of multina-
tional enterprises in promoting technology transfer; the
extent to which foreign firms act as "export catalysts" for
domestic firms; the rise or fall of wage rates for local
workers in multinational enterprises; and the validity of the
"pollution haven hypothesis," which states that foreign
investors flock to developing countries to take advantage of
lax environmental standards.
These studies reflect the increasing importance of foreign
investment as a source of capital for developing countries.
In 1993, direct foreign investment was the largest single
source of external finance for developing countries,
accounting for about half of all private resource flows.
Following the virtual disappearance of commercial bank
lending to these countries in the 1980s, many countries
liberalized their restrictions on incoming foreign
investment. Some countries even tilted the balance towards
foreign firms by offering special incentives: in Czechoslo-
vakia, joint ventures pay lower income taxes than domestic
enterprises; foreign firms in much of the Caribbean receive
income tax holidays, import duty exemptions and subsidies
for infrastructure.
The pro-investment policies of the 1990s are very
different from the wave of nationalizations which drove out
foreign investment in many regions during 1960s and
1970s. The new attitude is in part driven by the need for
alternative sources of new capital, and in part driven by
increasing skepticism about import-substituting trade and
investment strategies. India, within one year, liberated both
its trade regime and opened up its internal market to foreign
investors, leading to what Indian Finance Secretary Montek
Ahluwalia dubbed a "quiet economic revolution."
Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer:
Morocco and Venezuela
One reason to subsidize incoming foreign investors is the
idea that they convey benefits which cannot be completely
captured by the firm, such as new technology. Although
technology transfer occurs through many different avenues,
Winter ] 994
foreign investment could play an unusual role in several
respects. New technology may not be commercially
available and innovating firms may refuse to sell their
technology via licensing agreements. In this case, alliances
with innovating firms or close proximity to these firms may
be the best means of learning about new technology.
Foreign investment may also provide the competition
necessary to stimulate technology diffusion, particularly if
local firms are protected from import competition. Finally,
foreign investors may provide a form of worker training
which cannot be replicated in domestic firms or purchased
from abroad, such as managerial skills. Technology
diffusion may occur through lahor turnover as domestic
employees move from foreign to domestic firms.
The studies on Morocco and Venezuela tested the
magnitude of technology transfer from foreign subsidiaries
(or joint ventures) to wholly domestically owned firms.
This is a working definition for the idea of a technology
"spillover." 1 explored two related questions. First, to what
extent do joint ventures or foreign subsidiaries perform
better than domestic firms? Second, are there technology
spillovers from firms with foreign equity investment to
domestically owned firms?
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are defined as any firm
with foreign equity participation in the firm. Firm perfor-
mance is measured as either labor productivity (output per
worker) or a multi-factor productivity measure—which
measures the productivity of all the firm's inputs simulta-
neously. Technological change is defined as an increase in
output after taking into account all increases in the various
inputs in production. Obviously, this concept of techno-
logical change is not an engineering concept. Technological
change is synonymous with increases in observed produc-
tivity at the enterprise level.
In both Morocco and Venezuela, MNEs—firms with
foreign equity participation—exhibit much higher levels of
productivity. In Venezuela, increases in foreign equity
participation also led to higher productivity growth. There
is strong evidence that an infusion of foreign investment
does more than simply provide additional capital to enter-
prises—it is also accompanied by knowledge transfers
which lead to better firm performance.
Yet there is no evidence that the benefits accruing to joint
ventures or local suhsidiaries of multinationals are diffused
to domestic firms. In other words, foreign investors
provide direct benefits to those firms receiving the
investment, but there are no "spillovers" to other plants. In
fact, an increased multinational presence in Venezuela hurt
the productivity of domestic competitors, in part hecause
the multinationals took market share away from domestic
plants.
These research results reinforce earlier case study
evidence as well as interviews with plant managers in
Morocco and Venezuela. The lack of technology transfer to
domestic competitors can be explained hy the limited hiring
of domestic employees in higher level positions, very little
labor mobility between domestic firms and foreign subsid-
iaries, limited subcontracting to local firms, no research and
development by subsidiaries, and few incentives by multina-
tionals to diffuse their knowledge to local competitors.
Foreign Investment and Breaking into
Export Markets: Mexico
Anecdotal evidence, mostly derived from case studies in
developing countries, suggests that the process of breaking
into foreign markets can he very difficult. In order to
export, firms must obtain information about foreign tastes
and establish distribution channels in foreign markets. One
ohvious way for firms to learn about export markets is to
observe other exporters who have already acquired
experience selling abroad. Those exporters may be other
domestic firms, or multinationals.
Case studies suggest that multinationals bring infor-
mation about export markets to local producers, enabling
them to access markets abroad. In Bangladesh, one Korean
garment producer started a booming export business,
triggering tbe entry into export markets of hundreds of new
Bangladeshi garment producers. If this phenomenon is
widespread, then governments may want to encourage
foreign investors in sectors with high export potential but
little know-how about foreign markets.
In a research project with Brian Aitken at the IMF and
Gordon Hanson at the University of Texas, we test for the
possibility that other exporters can reduce the cost of
foreign market access for a firm contemplating the jump
into export markets. In particular, we examine whether
locating near multinational exporters helps a firm to gain
information ahout the export process.
Ours is the first study which provides statistical evidence
on the role of foreign firms as "catalysts" for other
exporters. The basis for our study is 2,113 Mexican
manufacturing plants over the period between 1986 and
1990. Following Mexico's trade reform in 1985, many
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Mexican manufacturers turned away from the previously
protected domestic market towards outside markets. These
changes during the 1980s allow us to identify the kinds of
firms most likely to become exporters.
The analysis shows that multinational firms in Mexico do
act as export catalysts. Domestic firms located near multi-
national exporters are much more likely to export than
other firms. This suggests that foreign investors bring
valuable information about export possibilities to devel-
oping countries—which then "spills over" to domestic
rivals. One implication is that firms wishing to break into
export markets should locate in areas with a concentration
of multinational export activity. Another implication is that
governments may wish to encourage exporters or potential
exporters to locate near each other.
One policy option for developing countries is to
encourage export processing zones (EPZs), special
economic zones reserved for exporting firms. These zones
often confer special benefits to exporters, such as duty-free
imported inputs, tax holidays, or subsidized infrastructure.
Our research suggests one unintended benefit of EPZs: by
forcing potential exporters to locate near each other, they
may help reduce the costs of breaking into foreign markets.
However, EPZs need to be carefully designed to avoid
isolating exporters from other enterprises. EPZs in
countries Hke Jamaica, for example, are placed in fortress-
like enclaves which isolates exporters from other enter-
prises.
Wages and Foreign Investment
Critics argue that foreign investors leave the United States
and other developed countries in search of lower wages.
According to these critics, foreign investors take advantage
of weak labor laws to pay very low wages under abysmal
working conditions. My current research on foreign
investment suggests the opposite: foreign-owned firms
generally pay higher wages than domestic firms, leading to
an increase in overall wages in the host country.
My research examines wage-setting by foreign firms in
the United States, Mexico and Venezuela.^ In the United
States, foreign subsidiaries pay 10% to 20% higher wages
than domestic firms. In developing countries like Mexico or
Venezuela, the wage gap is even larger—multinationals pay
as much as 30% more than domestic firms. The large wage
premium paid by multinationals both in the United States
and abroad provides strong evidence against the hypothesis
that multinationals unfairly exploit domestic labor. In the
U.S. case, however, much of the wage gap can be explained
by the fact that foreign investors tend to invest in high wage
industries. Within those industries, there is only a small
difference in wages paid by multinationals and domestic
firms. In addition, multinationals tend to he relatively
large, and large firms typically pay higher wages than small
firms.
In the developing countries, however, the wage gap
cannot he explained by the fact that foreign investors locate
in high wage industries. The wage gap between foreign and
domestic firms is large even within the same industry. We
explore one hypothesis that multinationals simply hire all
the best workers away from their domestic competitors.
This would imply that even if wages are higher in foreign
firms, average wages do not rise with an influx in foreign
investment. In fact, the results show that average wages do
rise with increases in foreign investment—implying that
multinationals are not just hiring the best workers.
The higher wages paid by multinationals reflect the fact
that these firms bring in new ideas and technology, raising
the productivity of their workers. Anecdotal evidence also
suggests that multinational firms try to keep their
employees from leaving, especially after investing in special
training for their workers. Higher wages are one way to
ensure that employees stay with the firm. Whatever the
explanation, it seems clear that countries who encourage
foreign investors benefit in at least one dimension: higher
wages for employees of multinational firms.
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Pollution Havens and Foreign Investment
In addition to fears of worker exploitation, the surge in
foreign investment in developing countries has been cause
for alarm in various policy circles. In the United States,
some environmentalists argue that multinationals are
flocking to developing countries to take advantage of lax
environmental standards. This so-called pollution haven
hypothesis, which assumes that pollution abatement costs at
home are large enough to significantly affect the location
and magnitude of foreign investment abroad, has received a
lot of attention in both tbe popular and academic press.
My research with Gunnar Eskeland at the World Bank
tests for the possibility that foreign investors are drawn to
these so-called "pollution havens" focusing on the manufac-
turing sectors in Mexico, Venezuela, Ivory Coast and
Morocco. The analysis of pollution havens and foreign
investors is divided into two parts. First, we examined
whether foreign investors in these countries are attracted
towards "dirtier" sectors, defined as product groups where
either pollution emissions are high or pollution abatement
costs are bigh (such as cement or oil refining). Second, we
then compared the energy efficiency of domestic enterprises
and multinationals in these same countries. This allowed us
to see whether foreign investors played an important role in
improving tbe environment by using more energy-efficient
tecbnology as well as cleaner sources of energy.
Our research provides little support for tbe pollution
haven hypothesis. There is no tendency for multinational
firms to locate in dirtier sectors, although there is weak
evidence that they do locate in sectors witb higher
abatement costs. These conclusions are consistent with
earlier studies which find no evidence that multinationals
are drawn to pollution havens.'' One reason is that pollution
abatement costs are typically not a major component of
operating costs for firms. Another reason is that foreign
investors find other factors more important in deciding to
relocate abroad—such as the size of the domestic market.
Multinational firms are significantly more efficient in
their use of energy tban domestic plants. In addition, multi-
nationals tend to use cleaner types of energy, such as
electricity and natural gas. Even if we take into account tbe
fact tbat multinational enterprises are typically younger
than domestic firms, we still find that firms of the same
vintage are more energy efficient. To tbe extent that energy
use is a good proxy for pollution emissions, this suggests
that multinationals in developing countries tend to use
cleaner technologies than domestic firms.
These findings still leave many questions unanswered.
Ideally, we would like to be able to compare actual pollution
emissions of domestic and foreign plants, but that infor-
mation is not yet available. It is also possible that foreign
investors, while more environmentally conscious than
developing country firms, do not adhere as carefully to
environmental regulations as their competitors back home.
Yet tbe results do suggest that foreign investors are unlikely
to flock to Mexico to take advantage of looser environ-
mental standards. We also find that multinationals are more
energy efficient and use cleaner sources of energy than
domestic firms.
Conclusion
To summarize, these four studies on multinational enter-
prises operating in Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco, and
Venezuela suggest that:
" More foreign investment at the enterprise level is
associated witb improved performance and higher produc-
tivity. Clearly joint ventures benefit from foreign partner-
ships.
• Joint ventures and foreign subsidiaries, however, do not
transfer tecbnology to domestic enterprises. Domestic
competitors, in fact, appear to be harmed by foreign entry.
• MNEs act as export catalysts, helping domestic firms to
break into export markets.
• MNEs pay much higher wages than domestic firms,
which suggests that incoming foreign investment may
provide one way to raise living standards for at least a part
of the population.
" There is almost no evidence that MNEs are drawn to
industrial sectors where pollution emissions or pollution
abatement costs are high. This provides evidence against
the pollution haven hypothesis.
• MNEs are much more energy efficient than domestic
firms, and also use cleaner types of energy.
}0 The Columbia Journal of World Business
With these findings in mind, governments should
continue to open domestic markets to foreign investment,
which is associated with rising productivity and higher
wages for participating firms. However, there is no
reason to subsidize incoming foreign investment—none
of tbe technology which is transferred to joint ventures
or subsidiaries is absorbed by local competitors. This
suggests that there is no reason to give tax breaks or
subsidies for infrastructure. One exception to the no-
subsidy rule may be for export-oriented multinationals,
who act as export catalysts for domestic firms who seek
to break into foreign markets.
To ensure tbat domestic firms benefit as much as possible
from foreign investment, host country governments may
wish to encourage domestic and foreign firms to locate near
each otber. Export Processing Zones are effective as long as
they do not isolate exporters from other firms. Measures to
encourage worker turnover between foreign and domestic
firms, such as labor regulations which make it easy to hire
and dismiss workers, should also help to spread tbe benefits
from foreign entry.
Multinationals should continue to pay a wage premium,
wbich discourages worker turnover and keeps technology
from spreading to domestic competitors. Higher wages and
cleaner production processes contribute to a good image in
the host country, enhancing labor-management and
government relations. There are also benefits from locating
near other multinationals, who have developed supplier and
buyer linkages, as well as a pool of well-trained employees.
Domestic competitors, however, will find themselves at a
disadvantage when competing with incoming multina-
tionals. Although locating near multinationals can help
domestic firms to learn about export markets and give them
access to high quality suppliers, competition will intensify.
This is particularly true in markets protected from import
competition. One solution is to welcome foreign equity
participation, wbich is linked with higher productivity and
better performance.
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